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1 – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The popularity of computer-based smuggling has increased as a result of 
organizations taking measures to prevent traditional means of data exfiltration. Most 
organizations depend on broad and heterogeneous communication networks, which 
provide numerous possibilities for malicious users to smuggle sensitive private 
information out of their boundaries. They can achieve that objective with the use of 
network covert channels, that apart from carrying the data outside of the organization, 
hide the fact that the communication is taking place. This study provides a 
comprehensive, up to date review of the current state of research in the field of 
network covert channels: hidden communication channels that abuse legitimate 
network communication channels. It also presents a novel technique to establish such 
channels based on the use Digital Certificates, along with an informal framework to 
exfiltrate data making use of the technique. It involves the use of the Transport Secure 
Layer protocol, a network protocol normally used to provide confidentiality and 
integrity services to applications. 
 
Several detection and prevention mechanisms and methodologies exist or have been 
proposed to counter the threats posed by this hidden communication channels. They 
are also identified and discussed in this work, explaining their applicability and 
limitations. 
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2 – INTRODUCTION 
 
In any modern organization, the prospect of leakage of confidential information ranks 
among the highest fears of any executive. As most of these organizations depend on 
broad and heterogeneous communication networks, the possibilities for a malicious 
entity to smuggle sensitive private information out of the organization are numerous, 
and the detection of such event a challenging problem. It is rarely unambiguous to 
conclude which information is leaving the organization legitimately, and which 
communications are unauthorized data exfiltrations. It may even be impossible to 
determine if a communication is occurring at all. 
 
Furthermore, commercially available computer systems and networks are rarely 
strictly regulated. However, data transmitted on such systems and networks may still 
be relatively sensitive. As such, the availability of tools employed to inspect outbound 
e-mail, web traffic and other forms of network communications has increased 
significantly, to prevent and identify leakage of confidential data. 
 
At the moment, the most common means of information leakage are employees 
discussing proprietary information outside their employment context, reproduction of 
hard copies of classified documents and copying of confidential information on 
portable media. However, most organizations take measures to prevent them, which 
leads to an increased popularity of computer based data smuggling. 
 
Network communication channels can be abused to implement covert communication 
channels. The reliability, speed and robustness of communication protocols allow for 
the implementation of such channels over networks. Other than data exfiltration, 
covert channels can be used for a variety of purposes, depending on the goals the user 
is trying to achieve. Some of these pose serious threats: 
 
• Intelligence agencies and criminals can use them for covert communications. 
The use of encryption hides the content of communications, but it does not 
prevent adversaries to detect communication patterns, which is often sufficient 
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to discover onset anomalous activities. This makes them particularly useful in 
information warfare scenarios. 
• Hackers that have compromised systems normally use them as launching 
points for subsequent attacks. Covert channels can be used to send instructions 
to these systems, as if this traffic is not covert it would alert the systems 
administrator, who would easily discover the compromised systems. They can 
also be used as backdoors, as the intruders cannot rely on the initial 
exploitation vector remaining available. [1] 
• They can be used to circumvent measures taken by governments and private 
organizations to limit the freedom of speech and civilian use of strong 
encryption. 
 
A good indication of the threat they pose can be derived from the highly publicized 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks conducted against popular internet 
websites such as Yahoo!, CNN, E-bay, E-trade and Buy.com which occurred in 1999. 
These were automated using thousands of distributed agents, which communicated 
with each other through covert channels in network protocols. Another good example 
that exposes their risk is the accounts surfaced in 2002 of suspected secret, hidden 
conveyance of plans or instructions through the Internet to terrorist groups operating 
within the United States. It is believed that many of these messages were transmitted 
using covert channels, encrypted and embedded within innocent-looking files [2]. 
 
A common analogy employed for discussing the dynamics of covert communications 
is one known as the “prisoner’s problem”[3]. It involves two prisoners, called here for 
simplicity Alice and Bob, who need to communicate with each other in order to 
devise an escape plan. It also involves a warden, Wendy, who oversees all inter-
prisoner communications, and can monitor them in one of two ways: 
 
• She can examine all messages, and let them pass or deny them based on what 
she sees. This is a passive approach. 
• She can modify the message slightly to make sure it is not precisely what was 
sent, without changing the meaning of the message. By modifying the 
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message it is assumed that she might frustrate any attempt of embedding a 
secret message in the communication. This is an active approach. 
 
Ideally, the prisoners find a way to communicate which doesn’t raise suspicion from 
the warden. But the warden must accept that there is a risk that some covert 
communication may be attempted, and pose and hypothesis of how it might function.  
 
The main objective of a covert channel is to hide the fact that a communication is 
taking place. Cryptography is different, as there is no intention to conceal the 
communication, but rather the objective is to make the information being 
communicated available solely to the intended receiver. 
 
Covert channels and steganography (Greek for covered writing) are closely related 
and often confused. Both represent data-hiding techniques and involve piggybacking 
of messages on legitimate communication channels. Examples of steganography are 
the manipulation of bits in image or audio files to conceal information. Thus it can be 
said that steganography avails covert channels to transfer information secretly [4]. 
Actually, a variety of things can act as a conduit for steganographic communication. 
A Greek historian tells that a messenger’s head was shaved and tattooed with a secret 
message calling for revolt against the Persians. Later, the messenger travelled to the 
location of the intended receiver after the hair had re-grown. The head was shaved 
again and the message revealed to the receiver [5].  While steganography requires 
some form of content as cover, network covert channels require a network protocol as 
a carrier. The ubuiquitous presence of some network protocols (e.g. the Internet 
Protocol) makes covert channels highly available and usable even in situations where 
steganography cannot be applied. [6] 
 
They are the result of protocol specifications often being vulnerable to ‘misuse’ in 
unintended or unanticipated ways. This is due mainly to language peculiarities, lack 
of use of formal methods to define them, and the complexity of unambiguously 
postulating mind concepts that form the base of a protocol. They often include 
extendable and optional elements, which are normally not disallowed explicitly in 
situations where they have no use. Differences in implementations are also normally 
allowed, which reduces consistency. Covert channels adhering to protocol 
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specifications may be established in these cases and their detection is extremely 
difficult, as the resulting traffic cannot be considered anomalous. 
 
Analysis of covert channels is a long-standing academic discipline. Generally 
speaking covert channels can be classified by the type of resource that allows for the 
communication between two entities. Common shared resources comprise timing and 
storage channels. Timing channels exist when it is possible to influence the response 
time of a system. On the other hand, storage channels make used of shared storage 
medium to transmit information. Research on covert channels traditionally focused on 
storage and timing channels within single systems. However during the last decade 
the scope expanded to network based covert channels, as systems became 
interconnected through networks and inter-networks. 
 
The remainder of this study focuses on network based covert channels, as they pose a 
more obvious risk in information security. This is due in part to the comparative 
communication bandwidth and the greater availability of tools that enable the 
exploitation of this type of channels. Storage and Timing channels theory and 
concepts will be discussed in section 3, underlying the principles of covert 
communications. 
 
In section 4 an up to date review of the use of common network protocols as covert 
channel carriers is conducted. It is by no means a definitive guide, as it is included to 
give an idea of the different techniques available for transmitting data covertly. 
 
A set of novel covert channels is presented in section 5. They allow for covert 
communications based on the use X.509 Digital Certificates. An informal framework 
to exfiltrate data using this covert channels using the Transport Layer Secuity 
protocol is discussed in section 6. The decision to analyze these protocols was based 
on their property to provide functionalities to multiple applications and application 
layer protocols, which makes them omnipresent in different types of high security 
networks and systems. 
 
Detection and prevention of the different types of communication channels described 
in this study pose a number of serious challenges, which is discussed in section 7. 
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How the research community has tackled these challenges is also discussed in this 
section. 
 
Lastly, the conclusions that can be drawn from the results obtained in this study are 
exposed in section 8. 
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3 – COVERT CHANNELS THEORETICAL CONCEPTS 
 
The concept of covert channel is difficult to define precisely, and often leads to 
discussions on the meaning of “covertness”. No formal definition of covertness exists 
in the field of computer science, although research on detection of covert 
communications is very active. Informally, an operation is “more” covert if it is 
difficult to detect without the use of special tools that look for it explicitly [7].  
 
It is generally accepted that the concept of covert channels was first mentioned in the 
paper “A Note on the Confinement Problem” by B.W. Lampson [8], presented during 
the communications of the Association for Computer Machinery in 1973. Although 
the term was introduced in that paper, it restricted its use to a subclass of leakage 
channels that did not include storage channels and legitimate channels. According to 
Lampson, “a communication channel is covert if it is neither designed nor intended to 
transfer information at all”.  
 
Later work defines a covert channel as “a communication channel that allows a 
process to transfer information in a manner that violates the system’s security 
policy”[9]. This definition is now more commonly accepted. 
 
For the purpose of this study, a covert channel is defined as a communication channel 
that is not designed and/nor intended to exist and that can be used to transfer 
information in a manner that violates the existing security policy. 
 
Previous work is known on the topic of analyzing and modelling covert channels. 
However, there is no well-defined ontology. Two types of channels are presented on 
[9]: covert storage channels and covert timing channels. Moreover, the notion of 
measuring the threat level of a covert channel by looking for covert channels 
mechanisms with bandwidth that may exceed a certain amount of bits per second is 
also introduced. According to [9], “covert storage channels include all vehicles that 
allow the direct or indirect writing of a storage location by one process and the direct 
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or indirect reading of it by another”. Furthermore, “covert timing channels include all 
vehicles that allow one process to signal information to another process by 
modulating its own use of the system resources in such a way that the change in 
response time observed by the second process would provide information”. 
 
A more recently published classification model presented in [10] is also based on the 
dimension in which data is encoded (time, space), but captures the character-encoding 
paradigm as well (value-based, transition-based). The classification consist of four 
types of channels: 
 
• Value-based spatial channel: This type of channel encodes data within a 
spatial container (e.g.: using the corresponding representation of a letter from 
a Unicode character set to covertly communicate the letter through a TCP 
Initial Sequence Number). 
• Transition-based spatial channel: This type of channel encodes data by 
representing it as changes between spatial containers (e.g.: covertly 
communicating a letter by crafting a TCP packet with a specific source port, 
and then crafting a second packet with a different source port, the transition 
between source ports representing the letter). 
• Value-based temporal channel: This class encodes data by modulating the 
occurrence of events (time dimension, e.g.: using network packet arrival times 
to implement a binary channel). 
• Transition-based temporal channel: This class encodes data by modulating 
intermediate events on the occurrence of events (e.g.: using network jitter to 
implement a binary channel). 
 
 
Other terms of characterization are also commonly used for network covert channels, 
although on a more informal level [11]. Some of these are: 
 
• Behaviour: Indicates how the carrier protocol is used to send data. 
o Active: The covert channel generates it’s own traffic (e.g.: via a 
purposely developed application). 
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o Passive: The covert channel piggybacks on legitimate traffic generated 
by another process. This characteristic makes it dependent on external 
events in order to communicate data. 
 
• Path: Indicates the logical route that lies between the sender and receiver. 
o Direct: The sender communicates directly to the receiver. 
o Indirect: The sender communicates with the receiver through 
intermediate forwarding or bouncing nodes. 
o Spread: The sender splits data and sends it to multiple intermediate 
nodes, which converge the data and send it to the intended receiver. 
 
• Efficiency: Indicates the amount of data that can be sent per carrier unit. 
o Space: Normally expressed as the number of bits/bytes per packet 
(spatial channels) or the number of packets per bit/byte (temporal 
channels) that can be transmitted through the channel. 
o Time: Normally expressed as the number of bits/bytes per second 
(spatial channels) or the number of seconds per bit/byte (temporal 
channels). 
 
Various distinct parameters to characterize covert channels were introduced on [12], 
the most relevant being: Noise, Bandwidth, Capacity Synchronization and 
Aggregation. 
 
According to [12], a covert channel is noiseless if the receiver decodes correctly any 
bit transmitted by a sender with probability 1. Bandwidth is used to denote the rate at 
which information is transmitted through a channel. In a covert channel context, 
bandwidth is represented in bits/second, and is also related to the notion of capacity, 
the maximum possible error-free information communication rate in bits per second. 
Because error-correcting codes help turn a noisy channel into a noise-less one, these 
two parameters are closely linked. The resulting channel will, however, have a lower 
bandwidth than the similar noise-free channel [12]. Synchronization between the 
communicating entities allows them to notify the other when they have completed 
reading or writing data. Communications channels may be aggregated serially, in 
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parallel, or in combinations of serial and parallel aggregation to yield optimal 
bandwidth. All these parameters are further explained in the following section. 
 
It is also possible to characterize channels by their multiplexing/de-multiplexing 
possibilities and the difference between control and data channels, as described in 
section 3.1. 
 
3.1 COMMUNICATION CONCEPTS FOR NETWORK COVERT 
CHANNELS 
 
As network covert channels are communication channels that are not designed nor 
intended to exist, the communication streams must be embedded inside authorized 
channels. They may be based on existing protocols from OSI low layers (e.g.: IP, 
TCP, UDP) to OSI high layers (e.g.: HTTP, SMTP). However the carrier protocol 
must be authorized by the Network Access Control System (NACS), and trade-offs 
regarding reliability and covertness must be accepted. Several communication 
concepts apply to the communication of data through covert channels. 
 
3.1.1 – Control / Data Channels 
 
Covert channels may consist, from an abstract perspective, either of a control channel 
and a data channel, or both [10]. Although neither of these terms have an academic 
definition, we may state that control channels carry the information necessary to 
handle the flows of information from one entity to another: establishing 
communication flows and managing resources and parameters such as bandwidth, 
latency and covertness; and that data channels are reliable communication channels 
that can be used to transfer information from one entity to another [13]. 
 
The control operations can normally be completed with short amounts of information. 
Specific communication establishment procedures may be sufficient to handle data 
channels for a certain period of time without having to establish a control channel. 
Theses procedures may involve different parameters such as the type of compression/ 
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encryption to be used during the communication or what to do when specific 
attributes (e.g.: bandwidth, stealthness) reach a certain level. 
 
The control channel has to be as stealthy as possible. Any unusual activity regarding 
the standard behaviour (e.g.: sessions, large amounts of data/ packets) should be 
avoided. Furthermore, the control channel is intended to transfer relatively short 
amounts of data, so bandwidth is of lesser importance and focus should be placed on 
stealth and latency parameters. 
 
3.1.2 – Aggregation 
 
As covert channels are based on legitimate communication channels permitted by 
Network Access Control Systems (NACS) , it is often possible to use more than one 
of these channels, and even different types of these channels, as simultaneous carriers 
for the covert channels. Each one of these channels has it’s own requirements in terms 
of quality attributes. For example, different communication channels over HTTP, 
ICMP and SMTP protocols may be used simultaneously with the objective of 
increasing the stealthiness of a control channel. Further actions may help achieve this 
objective, such as changing the carrier protocol frequently or randomly, or after the 
stealthier protocol has been identified in a particular scenario. 
 
However, the use multiple communication channels might be counter-productive in 
terms of stealthiness, as it may alert NACS administrators of the existence of ongoing 
covert communications. Other possibility is the aggregation of multiple data and/or 
control channels over a single communication channel. This is most useful when the 
NACS in place has a very restricted number of permitted communication channels. 
As this approach involves multiplexing of several channels over a single one, 
bandwidth usage of the latter may increase significantly, which may lead to the 
detection of the covert communications. 
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3.1.3 – Communication architectures 
 
The primary goal of covert channel communication architectures is to remain covered 
long enough to transfer information before the cover time of the information elapses. 
Standard client/ server and peer-to-peer architectures may be used to achieve this 
purpose [13]. 
The client / server architecture differentiates the setup and operating modes of client 
and servers. Generally, the client(s) send request(s) to the server(s), which process the 
requests and responds with the results. This architecture is scalable as long as at least 
one server is available to the client(s). 
In peer-to-peer architectures, all nodes involved operate as clients and servers, the 
main advantage being the independence of the availability of a limited number of 
servers. 
 
Various communication models may be used to implement covert channels over these 
architectures. The most simplistic model consists of the direct communication of the 
client and the server through a point-to-point connection. In this model a server 
component or process is running on a system on an external network and the client 
component, located in the internal network establishes a communication channel 
through the NACS. This model is simple to implement in practice, although it 
provides restricted possibilities, as the server and client components can only operate 
in the manner they were designed, which limits their flexibility. In many situations, 
however, this is enough to achieve the goal of covert communication. 
 
Another valid communication is the “proxy model”, which may allow the use of a 
covert channel for different types of data. It involves an additional component, a 
Proxy, which accepts data streams from clients and servers and acts as an 
intermediary. This model enables the use of distinct applications while using one or 
multiple types of covert channels. It is one of the most popular models among covert 
channel practical implementations and tunnelling implementations. 
 
In scenarios where it is desirable for the NACS protected services to open the 
communication channels, a reverse communication model can be implemented, in 
which the server components themselves initiate the communication channels from 
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the internal network and wait for requests. This model applies to the client/server and 
proxy models. 
 
4 – COVERT CHANNELS ON COMMON NETWORK 
PROTOCOLS 
 
In the following sections different covert channels that have been identified on several 
commonly used network protocols are described. Most of them involve the 
manipulation of protocol features and the embedding of data on header fields in order 
to transfer information covertly. 
 
4.1 – Internet Protocol (IP) 
 
The Internet Protocol is the network layer protocol that drives the Internet, providing 
for the transfer of data in the form of packets across the network. It is responsible for 
routing, the process of selecting a path a network. It is an enabler for wide area 
networking, which means that its scope is global and can cover disparate network 
subsystems. This makes it a very popular target for data hiding. 
 
Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) header tunnelling was one of the first instances of 
covert channels on the network layer. Each packet contains a protocol header that 
consists of 23 fields, used for a variety of purposes such as the carrying of routing 
information, Quality of Service and fragmentation. However this variety results in an 
inherent risk of them to be used to transmit data instead of network managing 
information. Data can be transferred covertly between networks, by compressing data 
to a form that can be embedded in the header. Although these headers are open to 
inspection, the embedded value is considered legitimate and is not considered 
anomalous. 
 
The 16 bit IP Identification field is the most eligible choice. It can be used for byte-to-
byte covert communication. The protocol specification states that it is used to identify 
individual packets in case packet fragmentation occurs in the network. Packets with 
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the same ID refer to the same original datagram; this way the destination host can re-
establish the complete datagram. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Internet Protocol Header [33] 
 
The value of this field should be a number chosen randomly; although operating 
systems differ in the way they generate this number. In general, it is increased by one 
upon transmission of a packet. It may also contain a non-random value without 
disrupting the IP mechanism, which means 16 bits of data can concealed in this field 
by crafting packets that use a predetermined value. A covert channel can be created 
by encoding data in separate 16 bit values and transmitting them in the IP ID field, 
then decoding them on the other end. 
 
Another IP header field suitable for the transmission of data is the 3 bits Flags field, 
specifically the Don’t Fragment (DF) flag. It may be considered a redundant bit and 
thus its value doesn’t influence the normal IP operations. The downside of using this 
field for covert communications is its low size. It can only hold one bit per IP packet. 
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The IP header also contains a 24-bit Options field. Its use is optional and intended to 
provide for control functions that are useful in some situations, but unnecessary in 
most common communication scenarios. In some cases it can also be used to transfer 
data without interrupting the IP protocol service. A novel covert channel is proposed 
in [14] which allows for the sending of short messages encoded in the Record Route 
options field. A practical implementation that exploits this channel has been 
developed, and is based on a common application that makes use of this field, the 
traceroute command [14].  
 
Concealment of data on the 8-bit Padding field is also possible. It is normally used to 
pad the Options field to align it to a 32-bit block. This field should only contain 
zeroes, but can be used by malicious users to transfer data as well. 
 
The possibility of establishing a covert channel through the Time To Live (TTL) field 
has also been studied [6]. In this case, the sender manipulates the TTLs of subsequent 
packets, transmitting information to the receiver covertly. However, an encoding 
scheme is also necessary to achieve this, since network elements along the path also 
modify the TTL, creating a natural variation of its value. The use of any other TTL 
values apart from the few normal initial TTLs used in common systems would appear 
highly suspicious. The encoding scheme proposed consists of the use of two symbols: 
low-TTL signals and high-TTL signals. This allows for the traffic to look as 
legitimate traffic, although provides a low efficiency of one bit per packet. This 
however can be optimized employing some of the communication models presented 
earlier. 
 
A new enhanced version of the Internet Protocol, known as the Internet Protocol 
version 6 (IPv6), is intended to replace the current used version in the coming years. It 
provides improved reliability, broader address space and better security than its 
predecessor. However, it is also significantly more complex, which leads to an 
increased vulnerability to being used for covert communications. 
 
A particularly interesting feature of the IPv6 protocol in the context of covert 
channels is the Extension Headers, which are legitimately used for a variety of 
purposes. These headers have 16 bits to specify the Next Header type, 8 bits to 
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indicate the header length, and a variable length options field. The two high order bits 
of the options field indicate the action that must be taken in case the option type is not 
recognized.  A covert channel could possibly be established by generating a 
destination options extension header, and a proof-of-concept messaging application 
employing this mechanism has been developed [15]. Other interesting field of the 
IPv6 header that may possibly be used a carrier for a covert channel is the 8-bit 
Reserved Field. According to [11] it might be possible to hide 8 bits of data in this 
field. The modulation of destination addresses to communicate data covertly may also 
become a viable approach, given the large size of the IPv6 address space [11]. 
 
4.2 – Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
 
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is the transport-layer protocol that provides 
reliable data transmission on the Internet. The same reasons that make the Internet 
Protocol an evident carrier target for covert communications apply to TCP. 
 
Figure 2 - Transport Control Protocol header [33] 
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One of the main purposes of the TCP protocol is the provision of packet reordering on 
arrival at the receiver and the provision of a retransmission service that allows the 
receiver to request the retransmission of particular segments. This is achieved with the 
use of sequence numbers, which are stored in the 32-bit TCP sequence number field. 
Initially, an Initial Sequence Number (ISN) is generated randomly, which is used in 
the first segment of a TCP session (SYN segment). The receiving host normally 
responds acknowledging it received the first segment (SYN / ACK segment), and uses 
the ISN + 1 as the sequence number (acknowledgment number). However, the use of 
a non-random value in the sequence number field doesn’t disrupt the TCP protocol. 
This implies that a malicious user can use this field to transmit 32 bits of arbitrary 
data per segment. Furthermore, because random values are normally expected in this 
field, covert channels using it as carrier are particularly hard to detect. 
 
TCP also provides a mechanism to acknowledge the proper receipt of packets to the 
source. This is achieved using the 32-bit acknowledgement number field, which 
contains the values of the sequence number of the originator incremented by 1. It has 
been proved that the sender IP address of a TCP segment can be spoofed, causing the 
receiver to acknowledge to an arbitrary host with the incremented value transmitted 
through this field. This technique makes use of a bouncing host.  
 
 
4.3 – Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) 
 
 
The Internet Control Message Protocol is a network layer protocol designed to 
troubleshoot IP-based network communications through informational, error and test 
messages. ICMP packets are encapsulated in IP datagrams. A detailed description of 
the operation of the ICMP protocol can be found in [16]. 
 
Two of the most common ICMP messages are the echo-request and echo-reply 
messages, normally used to diagnose network problems. Normal operation consists of 
the sending of an echo-request message to a particular host, who answers with an 
echo-response message. The protocol also allows the returning of variable length data 
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to the sender in the Optional Data field. Some IP options such as router alert, record  
route and timestamp can be used when encapsulating ICMP echo-request messages, 
which provides a channel for covert communications between the communicating 
entities [17]. Currently, most Network Access Control Systems restrict the use of 
these messages. However, they are allowed in many situations for use in network 
diagnosis, and the contents of the messages are usually not filtered. 
 
 
Figure 3 - Internet Control Message Protocol header [34] 
 
Another ICMP message that can be used to establish a covert channel is the address 
mask request [17]. The request normally fills the 32-bit address mask field with 
zeroes, but can be used to transmit data instead. However the scope of a covert 
channel based in this technique would be very limited, as these messages are sent 
from a host to a router on the same Local Area Network (LAN). 
Several practical implementations exist that make use of ICMP messages for covert 
communications. These will be discussed in section 4. 
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4.4 – Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) 
 
IP multicasting allows the transmission of data to a subset of host computers, which 
can be spread across different physical networks across the Internet. A given subset is 
known as a Multicast Group. Multicast routers and hosts communicate group 
membership information via the Internet Group Management Protocol. The protocol 
is based on messages, specifically report messages, sent from a host to router to 
communicate the joining of a group, membership continuation or the leaving of a 
group; and query messages, sent by to routers to hosts for group monitoring purposes. 
IGMP packets are encapsulated in IP datagrams for transmission, where the 
destination address is a multicast address. 
 
The IGMP header contains unused fields which can be used for covert 
communications through proper embedding / extraction processes at the 
communicating ends. Report messages provide an 8-bit unused field, which is 
actually set to zeroes and ignored by the receiver, while query messages provide 16 
unused bits, which are also set to zeroes and ignored by the receiver. These can be 
combined with covert channels techniques in the IP header (described in section 4.1) 
to increase the bandwidth of the covert channel. [17] 
 
The IGMP protocol, however, is designed for communications between hosts and 
routers on the same network. The TTL field in the IP header for IGMP messages is 
normally set to 1, which makes this messages unroutable outside the originator’s local 
network. This limits the scope of covert communications using this protocol to embed 
secret data. 
 
4.5 – Hyper-Text Transport Protocol (HTTP) 
 
The Hyper-Text Transport Protocol is an application-layer protocol designed to 
transfer information over networks. Its operation consists of synchronous 
communication using request-response message pairs, the most common being GET 
and POST pairs. The protocol specification [18], however, contains six request types. 
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Almost all organizations allow the use of the HTTP protocol, as the World Wide Web 
is the primary information resource. It is widely implemented and used across 
different types of networks, which makes it an interesting target for carrying covert 
channels. Lower layer protocols (IP, TCP, ICMP) present numerous limitations such 
as limited capacity and modification of packets at intermediate nodes. For this reason 
HTTP has become the most used protocol for covert communications, and several 
different mechanisms to transfer data covertly using this protocol have been proposed 
and implemented. 
 
HTTP request messages may contain multiple headers, some common examples being 
“User-agent” and “Referer”.  Malicious users can exploit this by using headers to 
transmit arbitrary data. A particularly interesting feature of the HTTP protocol is the 
Entity-body. It is normally only used in HTTP POST requests is the, because it has no 
real use for other types of requests. However, the protocol specification doesn’t state 
explicitly that this should not be present in other request types, which enables the 
transmission of arbitrary data by a malicious user in any request type. 
 
Just like HTTP request messages, HTTP response messages may contain multiple 
headers as well. Malicious users may exploit this by using headers to transmit 
arbitrary data in the same as request headers. When this field is combined with one of 
mentioned fields in the HTTP request messages a synchronous covert channel can be 
established. 
 
4.6 – Domain Name System (DNS) 
 
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a transport-layer protocol used for storing and 
querying information of domain names in a distributed database [11]. It is a well 
known and widely deployed protocol and provides for the resolution of domain names 
into their corresponding IP addresses and resolution of a domain’s mail server 
through the use of Mail Exchange (MX) records. 
 
Just like the HTTP protocol, DNS is a synchronous protocol based on request and 
response pairs, communication taking place with the use of messages. These 
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messages contain a message header, which is present on both request and response 
messages. 
 
 
Figure 4 - Domain Name System message header [35] 
 
The 16-bit identification (ID) field is used for keeping track of queries. A malicious 
user could design an algorithm that uses a shorter space to identify queries, and use 
the residual space to hide arbitrary data. [11] 
 
Other particularly interesting fields in the DNS header are the QDCOUNT, 
ANCOUNT, NSCOUNT and ARCOUNT fields. Their length is 16 bits, and they serve 
different purposes for the operation of the DNS protocol. The QDCOUNT field is 
used to state the number of entries that follow in the question section that comes after 
this header. The ANCOUNT field is used to state the number of resource records in 
the answer section that appears after this header. The NSCOUNT field is used to state 
the number of name server resource records entries in the answer section that follows 
this header. The ARCOUNT field is used to state the number of entries in the 
question section that follows this header. [19] If a malicious user has control over a 
rogue DNS server, he could use these fields to covertly transfer up to 16 bits of data 
in each one of them. However, to avoid disruption of the protocol, he must add the 
correct amount of queries and answers in the messages after this header as stated in 
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the corresponding fields. This could be achieved with the use of a purposely-designed 
algorithm that calculates the relative number containing both the data being 
transferred and any legitimate headers that follow. 
 
DNS query messages are followed by a set of headers. The QNAME field is used to 
store the string entered in the query subject to translation, and according to the DNS 
specification it should be in the form a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN). This 
filed is limited to the maximum length permitted for a FQDN, which is 255 bytes. A 
malicious user could use up to the 255 bytes permitted to transfer arbitrary data, 
although it must format it to carry 63 bytes per label to comply with the FQDN 
specifications. However, different implementations of the DNS protocol vary and in 
some cases these limits could be ignored and larger packets could be used [11] 
 
Answers to a DNS query consist of the message and query headers described above, 
plus a set of answer headers. The NAME field is used to identify the FQDN to which 
a resource record belongs [19]. Information can be transferred covertly using this field 
in the same way as described for the QNAME field in the query message. As in the 
previous case, the contents of the NAME filed must also comply with the FQDN 
rules. 
 
4.7 – Voice Over IP (VoIP) 
 
Recently, covert channels to transfer information through various VoIP protocol 
specifications such as control traffic (i.e. SIP, H.323, RTCP) or data transport 
protocols (i.e. RTP) have been discovered. They present a significant risk; emerging 
threats such as VoIP SPAM or Botnet may work in tandem to transfer control signals 
or binary executables through VoIP covert channels. [20] 
 
A proof of concept attack demonstrating this new VoIP threat has been developed 
(Vo2IP). It allows for the establishment of a hidden conversation by embedding 
further compressed voice data into regular PCM-based voice traffic (i.e. G.711 
codec). Therefore an eavesdropper who is not aware of the use of the covert channel 
can’t decode the conversation properly. [20] 
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In this particular attack, the input audio is compressed using the G.729 codec, and 
then embedded into a G.711 VoIP channel using the least significant bit (LSB) 
coding. G.729 is an audio data compression algorithm used to encode voice audio, 
and the standard codec operates at 8 Kbps. G.711 is a codec primarily used in 
telephony since the 1970s, and is also of the ITU-T standard and remains a "must 
support codec" in today's VoIP world. It operates at 64kbps. 
 
By replacing a single bit of each sample in the G.711 audio data, it is possible to 
inject 8kb of arbitrary information for each second. Vo2IP uses the least significant bit 
of each sample in order to minimize the changes in audio quality. The transfer of 
information at a faster rate is feasible by using more bits on each audio sample at the 
cost of reduced cover audio quality. 
 
4.8 – Ad-Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing Protocol 
(AODV) 
 
AODV is a routing protocol designed to reduce the amount of control traffic on ad-
hoc wireless networks by using on-demand route queries.  An originator broadcasts a 
route request when he needs to send a message, which contains destination identifiers, 
destination sequence numbers, source identifiers, source sequence numbers, and hop 
count. He then receives route replies, which contain the request data, a destination 
identifier and a route lifetime that states for how long the route should be stored in the 
routing table. 
 
A recent study has identified four potential covert channels in the AODV route 
discovery protocol [21]. The first is a timing covert channel, which can be realised by 
timing the requests at a previously agreed time interval. The second identified channel 
consists of the manipulation of the source sequence number. This number is normally 
used to aid in the establishment of routes from intermediate nodes back to the source. 
However, arbitrary data or specific increments of the value can be embedded in this 
field, thus creating a hidden communication channel. Arbitrary data can also be 
embedded in the lifetime field, as well as in the destination identifier. A message of 
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up to log2 (N -1) bits can be embedded in the destination identifier in a network with 
N nodes [21].  
 
This protocol is susceptible to these threats because the sending of requests is at 
discretion of the sender (on-demand). The source will be able to transmit hidden 
information with the condition that source and destination agree a covert 
communication protocol. A downside of these channels is that they tend to be noisy 
because of the nature of the mediums used in ad-hoc networks (wireless), and would 
probably require the use of synchronization mechanisms. 
 
Although this particular research focus is on the AODV protocol, other protocols used 
in ad-hoc networks might be also vulnerable to these threats. 
 
5 – COVERT COMMUNICATIONS USING X.509 
DIGITAL CERTIFICATES 
 
Users of a public key require confidence that the right remote person or system with 
which they will use an encryption or digital signature mechanism owns the associated 
private key. This confidence is obtained through the use of digital certificates, also 
referred to as public-key certificates. They are data structures that bind a public key to 
a subject, and incorporate a digital signature by a Certificate Authority (CA) to assert 
this binding. A certificate has a limited valid lifetime, stated in its contents. A wide 
range of applications may use public-key certificates, covering a broad array of 
interoperability objectives and an even broader array of operational and assurance 
requirements [RFC]. Their users are people and processes that use client software, 
and include electronic mail readers and writers, World Wide Web clients and servers 
and IPSec processes among many others; they operate in an ample range of 
environments. Different certifications schemes exist. A certificate might be generated 
by the user and signed by the CA, or the CA might generate the certificate and sign it 
on behalf of the user. 
 
ITU-T X.509 or ISO/IEC 9594-8 defines a standard certificate format (X.509). It was 
first published in 1988, defining the version 1 format, and it was later revised in 1993 
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to define the version 2 format. Experience gained while attempting to implement and 
deploy the standard highlighted the deficiency of the version 1 and 2 formats, which 
lead to the development of the X.509 version 3 certificate format (X.509 v3), 
standarised in 1996. It constitutes an extension of the version 2 format, achieved by 
providing additional extension fields. 
 
 
Figure 5 - Contents of a sample X.509 certificate [37] 
 
 
The modification of any value in a digital certificate can be detected by computing the 
digital signature of the certificate with the algorithm specified and comparing it to the 
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signature, which must be decrypted using the CA’s public key first. Thus, the use of 
certificates to exfiltrate data might seem like an impossible task. However, an attacker 
trying to exfiltrate data from a private system is not really concerned in verifying the 
validity of the key contained in the certificate, as he is using it for other purposes, so 
he might accomplish his objective even without completing the signature verification 
process. In some extreme cases the data could even be encoded in the signature or the 
public key. 
 
It is evident that this approach is a very naïve one, as legitimate users of the system 
will detect that the certificate has been modified when they try to verify the 
certificate’s signature. This means an attacker has to find a way to send modified 
certificates only to his client(s), and the private system’s rightful certificate to 
legitimate clients. If the attacker is trying to exfiltrate data, it is sound to assume that 
he has some control over the private system. He could choose to send the secret data 
embedded in the certificate only in certain cases, based on the source or destination 
address of the underlying packets or on the occurrence of particular events controlled 
by him (i.e. specially crafted requests to a server). 
 
A network based detection system, which can be even based on simple traffic 
analysis, could detect suspicious values on the different certificate fields used by the 
attacker (i.e.: odd validity dates). This means the attacker has to focus on encoding the 
data in a way that makes it look similar to that of a genuine certificate. A network 
based detection system based on more complex techniques can execute the signature 
verification process and discover that the certificate has been modified, although this 
would require that the detection system perform this for every certificate request, 
which can prove costly in terms of computing resources. 
 
Self-signed certificates constitute a particular case. The signature on a self-signed 
certificate is generated with the private key associated with the certificate’s subject 
public key, which proves that the issuer, who in many situations is the user, possesses 
both the public and private keys. Their use presents a much more interesting scenario 
for the malicious user trying to smuggle data. There is a possibility that the 
compromise of the private system might lead to the compromise of its private key, 
which is unfeasible in scenarios where trusted third parties (TTP) are used to sign the 
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certificates, as compromise of the TTP’s private key is extremely unlikely to say the 
least. In cases where the detection systems only verify the signature of the certificate, 
and do not perform analysis on the certificate itself, the transmission of secret data on 
the certificate can prove undetectable. The use of self-signed certificates is not 
uncommon, in particular in Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) based in the Web of 
Trust scheme. One could argue that if the attacker has compromised the system to the 
extent of compromising the user’s private key and the ability to generate a digital 
certificate with secret data, he could find an easier way to exfiltrate it than having to 
embed it in a public-key certificate. It is important to remember, however, that the 
objective pursued by using covert channels is not to hide the data being exfiltrated, 
but to hide the fact that the transmission is taking place, making it a appear as regular 
traffic. 
 
The basic syntax of a X.509 v3 certificate, as defined in [22] is as follows. It is 
specified in Abstract Syntax Notation 1 (ASN.1), and it is important to note that the 
data to be signed is encoded using the ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER). 
 
Certificate  ::=  SEQUENCE  { 
        tbsCertificate       TBSCertificate, 
        signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier, 
        signatureValue       BIT STRING  } 
 
   TBSCertificate  ::=  SEQUENCE  { 
        version         [0]  EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1, 
        serialNumber         CertificateSerialNumber, 
        signature            AlgorithmIdentifier, 
        issuer               Name, 
        validity             Validity, 
        subject              Name, 
        subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo, 
        issuerUniqueID  [1]  IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, 
                             -- If present, version MUST be v2 or v3 
        subjectUniqueID [2]  IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, 
                             -- If present, version MUST be v2 or v3 
        extensions      [3]  EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL 
                             -- If present, version MUST be v3 
        } 
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   Version  ::=  INTEGER  {  v1(0), v2(1), v3(2)  } 
 
   CertificateSerialNumber  ::=  INTEGER 
 
   Validity ::= SEQUENCE { 
        notBefore      Time, 
        notAfter       Time } 
 
   Time ::= CHOICE { 
        utcTime        UTCTime, 
        generalTime    GeneralizedTime } 
 
   UniqueIdentifier  ::=  BIT STRING 
 
   SubjectPublicKeyInfo  ::=  SEQUENCE  { 
        algorithm            AlgorithmIdentifier, 
        subjectPublicKey     BIT STRING  } 
 
   Extensions  ::=  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension 
 
   Extension  ::=  SEQUENCE  { 
        extnID      OBJECT IDENTIFIER, 
        critical    BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, 
        extnValue   OCTET STRING  } 
 
 
The attributes that can be potentially used to transfer data covertly have been 
highlighted, and are described in further detail in the next subsections. 
 
5.1 – serialNumber 
 
The serial number of a certificate is a value assigned by the CA used to uniquely 
identify a certificate. The X.509 specification [22] states that it must be a positive 
integer and that given its uniqueness requirements, users must be able to handle 
serialNumber values of up to 20 octects. The encoding of embedded data in this 
number can be used as a covert channel, although its detection is rather trivial as 
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legitimate values are not random, but generated in a specific way, depending on the 
CA. It may remain undetected by very simple detection systems and naïve analysts. 
 
5.2 – Validity 
 
The certificate validity period is the time interval during which the CA guarantees that 
the certificate information is accurate. The field consists of a sequence of two dates: 
the date on which the validity period begins (notBefore) and the date which marks the 
expiration of the certificate (notAfter). Both values may be encoded as UTCTime or 
GeneralizedTime. 
 
The universal time type, UTCTime, is a standard type designed for the representation 
of time and dates. It allows the specification of time to the precision of one minute or 
one second and the year is specified through the two low order digits.  In the context 
of public-key certificates UTCTime values must include seconds even when the 
number of seconds is zero. As the year is represented in two digits, when the value 
YY is greater than or equal to 50, it shall be interpreted as 19YY, and when it is less 
than 50, it shall be interpreted as 20YY. 
 
The generalized time type, GeneralizedTime is standard type designed for the variable 
representation of time. It must also include seconds, but not fractional seconds, 
representing time as YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ. 
 
The specification states that conforming validity dates through the year 2049 must be 
encoded as UTCTime, and dates in the year 2050 or later must be encoded as 
GeneralizedTime. 
 
A covert channel can be established by specially encoding data in the difference of 
these values. According to the specification, the minimum year value allowed for the 
notBefore date would be 1900, which would be represented by the digits 00 in the two 
low order digits. The notAfter data could have a theoretical maximum year value of 
9999, represented with four digits. Both notBefore and notAfter time values must be 
specified with a precision of seconds. This means that these values allow for the 
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following number of differences, which is equivalent to the number of seconds that 
exist between 00:00:00 of the year 1900 to 23:59:59 of the year 9999: 
 
(9999 – 1900) * 365 * 3600 = 10.642.086.000 
 
If a variation of one second is used to represent a message or symbol, this means that 
10.642.086.000 symbols could be encoded using this differential encoding scheme, 
roughly equivalent to 234 messages. Thus, up to 34 bits of data can be transferred 
covertly using this time-differential encoding scheme in a single digital certificate by 
manipulating its time validity. 
 
A value of the notAfter field earlier than the current date and time would be highly 
suspicious, as it would mean that the certificate has expired. That would reduce the 
amount of possible symbols that can be encoded using this scheme. Furthermore, the 
use of border values allowed for the validity of a certificate might also raise suspicion, 
as their use in legitimate situations is questionable, as it would generate in practical 
terms a certificate that never expires, or a certificate which use is allowed even before 
the invention of modern computer systems. The range should be chosen carefully in 
order to look innocuous, taking into consideration the current date and the standard 
validity periods used in different scenarios. Certificates with expiration dates of 3 or 
more years from the issuing date are not uncommon on the Internet, although those 
used in mid to high security systems it’s more likely to be a few days, hours or even 
minutes. 
 
It might be possible to adapt optimized differential encoding schemes for use in this 
scenario. They are likely to provide a more efficient use of the channel than the 
encoding scheme presented. This is left for future work. 
 
 
5.3 – Unique Identifiers 
 
The design objective of having subject and issuer unique identifiers is to allow for the 
possibility to reuse of subject and/or issuer names over time. However it is 
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recommended that names are not reused for different entities, and the use of these 
unique identifiers is not recommended in Internet certificates [22]. 
 
They are of the type BIT STRING that is an arbitrary length string of bits. This makes 
them particularly attractive to transfer data. These fields must only appear if the 
version of the certificate is 2 or 3. They must not appear in version 1 certificates.  
A significant limitation in using these fields for covert channels is that the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) has deprecated their use. This means that the mere 
presence of this field might seem suspicious by well-trained analysts and detection 
systems. 
 
6 – COVERT COMMUNICATIONS USING THE 
TRANSPORT SECURE LAYER PROTOCOL AND X.509 
DIGITAL CERTIFICATES 
 
The Transport Secure Layer (TLS) allows applications to communicate preserving 
privacy and data integrity in order to prevent eavesdropping, tampering and message 
forgery, among other threats. For example, it is used on the Internet to secure traffic 
between HTTP clients and web servers. On a typical scenario, only the server is 
authenticated. It is the successor to the Secure Socket Layer 3.0 protocol (SSL3). 
Both protocols are very similar, and share the same vulnerabilities [23]. 
 
TLS consists of two protocols, the record protocol and the handshake protocol, that 
normally run on top of a reliable transport protocol such as TCP. The record protocol 
provides a private connection service based on the use of symmetric encryption and 
Message Authentication Codes (MACs), while the handshake protocol provides 
services of peer authentication and shared secret negotiation. This section focuses on 
the TLS handshake protocol, specifically on the possibility of using covert channels 
through the manipulation of the TLS protocol headers to establish the parameters of 
an exfiltration covert channel using the methods described in the previous section. 
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Message Type Parameters 
hello_request Null 
client_hello Version, random, session id, cipher suite, compression 
server_hello Version, random, session id, cipher suite, compression 
certificate Chain of X.509v3 certificates 
server_key_exchange Parameters, signature 
certificate_request Type, authorities 
server_done Null 
certificate_verify Signature 
client_key_exchange Parameters, signature 
finished Hash value 
Table 1 - TLS Handshake Protocol Message types 
 
The handshake protocol is the most complex part of TLS. It is used before any 
application data is transmitted. It consists of a series of messages exchanged by the 
client and the server. The different message types are presented in Table 1. A very 
simplified description of the protocol, which does not include client authentication, is 
presented next. 
 
The first phase of the protocol is used to initiate a logical connection and to establish 
the security capabilities that will be associated with it. It is initiated by the client, with 
the sending of a client_hello message. This message is responded by the server with a 
server_hello message that contains the same parameters as the client_hello message. 
 
The second phase begins with the server sending its certificate; this message contains 
one or a chain of X.509 certificates. A certificate message is required for any agreed 
on key exchange method. The final message of this phase is the server_done 
message, to indicate the end of this phase. 
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Upon the receipt of the server_done message, the client initiates phase 3, after 
verifying that the server provided a valid certificate. He sends a client_key_exchange 
message, which contains the key material to be used for the key generation. The 
specific contents of this message depend on the key exchange method agreed in phase 
1. 
 
The fourth and final phase consists of the client sending a finished_message, which 
verifies that the key exchange and authentication processes were successful. It is 
responded by a server finished_message. At this point the handshake is complete and 
the client and server may start to exchange application data. 
 
The vulnerability of the TLS handshake protocol to covert channels has been studied 
[23], although on a slightly different context. Different fields from the messages 
involved have been identified as potential carriers for covert channels, the most 
relevant for this study being the cipher_suite and random fields. According to the 
authors, the cipher suite field sent by the client in the client_hello message can 
provide a few bits for covert communications, and the random field can provide 224 
bits for the same purpose. 
 
An interesting scenario would be to take advantage of these covert channels to request 
the exfiltration of data by a client attacker from a compromised server. As discussed 
in the previous section, an attacker trying to exfiltrate data in X.509 certificates might 
need to send modified certificates only to his client(s), while still being able to send 
the rightful certificate to legitimate clients. This might be accomplished by the 
sending of instructions through data encoded and embedded in the aforementioned 
TLS fields of client_hello messages. There must be processes on the server capable of 
interpreting and executing such instructions. 
 
These covert channels in the TLS protocol could also prove useful to establish 
different parameters to be used for the exfiltration of data via X.509 certificates. For 
example, the attacker could instruct a process on the compromised system which data 
to transmit, and in which specific fields and positions of the X.509 certificate to 
embed the data. Other useful attributes that can be specified by the attacker can be 
which type of encoding to use, or instruct the compromised server process to encrypt 
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the data using a specific algorithm. If the malicious user is employing the validity 
fields of the X.509 certificate using the encoding technique presented in the previous 
section, he could use the TLS covert channel to establish the notBefore or notAfter 
values, chosen according to the scenario. 
 
As the cipher suite and random fields are also present on server_hello messages, they 
could be used to acknowledge the reception of the malicious user messages, or to 
communicate back to the attacker any relevant information. 
 
A process on the compromised server would then proceed to generate a X.509 
certificate congaing the data to be exfiltrated, and send it to the attacker as part of 
phase 2 of the TLS handshake protocol, complying to the parameters previously 
specified. 
 
7 – PREVENTION AND DETECTION OF NETWORK 
COVERT CHANNELS 
 
The occurrence of covert channels cannot be completely eliminated, although it can 
be considerably reduced by careful design and analysis. A portion of the bandwidth of 
a legitimate communication channel that can be sidetracked, to be used as a carrier for 
covert communications, will always be present. 
 
The detection of this type of threats can be approached in different ways. One consists 
of the monitoring and detection of traffic that exceeds specific thresholds established 
previously at the network and/or transport layers. A signature based detection 
approach is also valid, in which case the traffic is monitored in search for 
characteristic patterns of specific tools used for the establishment of covert channels. 
The detection of protocol anomalies generated by some tools is also an indicator of 
the presence of covert communications. Another approach is to learn the “network 
behaviour” and the use statistical methods to establish if the current monitored 
network traffic corresponds to that recorded correct behaviour. 
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Standard IDS technologies are also commonly used to aid in the detection of covert 
communications, along with the deployment of Network Security Monitoring (NSM) 
models. According to [24], NSM involves “to collect, analyze and increase 
indications and warnings to detect and respond to intrusions".  [24]The same study 
states that "within the context of NSM indicators are outputs from products which are 
created by IDS and are usually referred to as alerts.  Trained people who may be 
referred to as analysts should be engaged in interpreting intrusions. The interpretation 
of indicators results in warnings.  Warnings are human conclusions which indicate to 
decision makers that a network may have been compromised." 
 
It is critical for any detection approach to limit the amount false positives, which is 
raising alerts for the possible presence of covert communications while the monitored 
traffic is completely legitimate. It is also important to keep the ratio of false negatives 
to the lowest, which is not raising alerts in the presence of suspicious traffic. 
 
A covert communication channel might be safe if the detection systems in place are 
signature-based and have no specific rule to look for it explicitly or if the set-up of 
such rule is too costly, either in terms of system resources, money or false-positives. 
 
Furthermore, it is possible to increase the difficulty of detection of covert channels 
with several methods.  A plausible strategy is to create confusion by using multiple 
sources and destinations. 
 
Several techniques to increase the number of destinations are described in [25]. One 
consists of the use of transit nodes that will forward data to the final destination. A 
second method involves the sending of traffic to legitimate destinations each time the 
channel is used. A solution to use legitimate third-party systems to store and retrieve 
information is also described [13]. 
 
The number of sources can also be multiplied in order to increase confusion of 
analysts and avoid detection. Distinct sources can be used alternatively to send data 
through a NACS. Some sources may send legitimate data as well to puzzle the 
detection team, or to increase the volume of traffic that needs to be analysed. [13] 
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There is also a possibility of using nonexistent sources and / or destinations. If it is 
known that the recipient is on the communication path to another network, messages 
could be sent to this other network and intercepted in transit by the intended receiver. 
Even the destinations themselves could encode the secret information to be 
transferred. [13] 
 
Research on detection targeted specifically on network covert channels is still in its 
early stages. Most of it discusses the theoretical possibilities of different approaches 
and techniques. However, after extensive research on identifying covert channels, 
their detection is a rapidly growing field of research. Different approaches, techniques 
and counter-measures have been proposed and demonstrated. The most relevant are 
briefly discussed in the following sections. 
 
7.1 – Simple Traffic Analysis 
 
Several covert “naïve” covert channels can be easily detected by conducting a traffic 
analysis at packet level. Different protocol stack implementations (e.g. different 
operating systems) normally exhibit well-defined characteristics in generated header 
fields. These can be used to establish a trusted baseline and identify anomalies that 
may be a sign of the use of protocol header manipulation for covert communications. 
For instance, a detailed description of the TCP/IP ISN and IP ID generation schemes 
in Linux and OpenBSD can be found in [26]. Similar studies have been conducted for 
several other protocols. An analyst could detect the manipulation of these protocol’s 
headers because the values generated by attacker’s tools can be differentiated easily 
from those generated by a genuine protocol stack. This same principle can be applied 
in many of the cases presented in section 4. However, if the attacker knows the 
method used by the victims’ system to generate these values, he could encode his data 
in an identical way, thus creating an undetectable covert channel [26]. 
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7.2 – Statistical traffic analysis 
 
Many of the fields normally chosen by attackers in protocol headers to carry data 
covertly are designed to contain random values. Actually most of these fields are not 
completely random, or are only random in a limited space [27]. When using these 
fields, covert channels normally try to preserve the randomness to avoid detection, for 
example by using encryption algorithms before embedding the data. However the 
space covered by the generated random values is different to the one covered by the 
ones generated by the legitimate systems’ algorithms, and thus can be detected. In 
some cases too much randomness can be suspicious. 
 
7.3 – Process Query Systems (PQS) 
 
Process query systems are a new retrieval information technology, in which queries 
are described as process descriptions [PQS]. They allow for a user to identify which 
process has generated which events from a given set of events. PQS have a broad 
range of applications, examples being the analysis of social networks and the tracking 
of fish and humans on video [27]. They can also be used to monitor networks, which 
is the most relevant application for the purpose of this discussion. 
PQS are used in [28] to detect timing channels based on binary codes. The authors 
warn that some models can return false-positives. The use of these systems for the 
detection of covert channels is considered excessive by some studies [27] 
 
7.4 – Neural Networks (NN) 
 
Artificial Neural Networks, normally referred to simply as Neural Networks, consist 
of a network of simple processing elements (neurons), which can exhibit complex 
global behaviour, determined by the connections between the processing elements and 
element parameters. The technique was originally inspired and intends to imitate the 
functioning of the central nervous system and the neurons. In a Neural Network 
model, simple nodes, which constitute the processing elements, are inter-connected to 
form a network.  They have several different applications, one of the most relevant for 
the information security field being the recognition of complex patterns and 
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sequences. They can be trained to recognize traffic characteristics that could be 
exploited by covert channels, and are very powerful in the sense that they can 
generalize [27]. NN can be trained to detect many different types of covert channels, 
but it is difficult to find the optimal number of neurons needed. 
Other major drawbacks are that their training can be time consuming, and can trigger 
false positives. [27] 
 
7.5 – Support Vector Machines (SVM) 
 
Support Vector Machines are somewhat similar to Neural Networks, in the sense that 
they have learning capabilities that can be used to identify patterns. It is a concept that 
uses mathematical and optimization techniques. The use of SVM to detect covert 
channels has been demonstrated in [29]. However, the covert channels used in the 
tests conducted in this study could also be detected by other simpler detection 
techniques such simple or statistical traffic analysis and are not really stealth.  
 
7.6 – Active Wardens 
 
An active warden, also referred to as a traffic normalizer, is a network application that 
intercepts all the traffic on a network and enforces its compliance with the pre-defined 
security policies. Its operation is similar to that of firewalls, but unlike them, wardens 
detect, remove or modify any likely carriers of covert channels on all network layers, 
with the objective of removing ambiguities from network protocols. For example, IP 
ID fields are set to zero when there is no fragmentation, and when there is, the IP ID 
of the fragments are changed and randomized [27]. 
 
In order for this approach to be viable, wardens must alter and distort the traffic to an 
extent that it does not affect the quality of the data received by the user, but 
eliminating potential sources of covert communication. This modification has been 
conceptualized as Minimal Requisite Fidelity (MRF) [30]. In theory, active wardens 
could be used in combination with one of the detection techniques described in 
previous sub-sections. 
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The concept of active warden has been discussed in the research community for over 
two decades. However no full practical implementation has been developed. A 
constraint of the design of active wardens is the context of a high-bandwidth, real-
time firewall, as the practical capabilities of an active warden vary extensively from 
those of a theoretical one. It is expected that the implementation of active wardens 
will improve the understanding on the extent of the viability of this approach. [30] 
  
7.7 – Quantized pumps 
 
The quantized pump system is and improvement of traditional one-way 
communication systems such as the store-and-forward protocol, the pump and 
upwards channel. Its operation is limited to one-way communications. Its objective is 
to minimize the amount of information that could be transmitted using covert 
channels. The bandwidth of such channels can be controlled precisely using this 
method. Its main use is to enforce the Bell-LaPadula security model. This model has 
been studied extensively in [31] 
 
7.8 – Risk Management Approach 
 
It is possible to compare covert channels to physical smuggling. Risk management 
approaches to smuggling are often based on the measurement of the probability of an 
incident taking place. This probability is normally derived from the implemented 
security measures and the existing threats. Related research has been conducted in the 
field of Nuclear Material trafficking [32]. 
 
Covert channels, however, correspond to threats that that take place in an unexpected 
form. Furthermore, they are generally part of a broader incident, and their nature 
makes them difficult to detect unless they lead to further incidents. This makes them 
very difficult to predict. These issues makes the assessment of covert channels 
through the use of probabilistic risk management very complex, and impacts on the 
ability of efficiently planning for the mitigation of such threats. 
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Security management standards, such as ISO 17799 and ISO 27001 do not treat 
covert channels expressly, but assume they are managed with broad network 
segregation and network connection controls. A framework that allows for the holistic 
identification of network covert channels is yet to be developed. 
 
8 - CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study makes important contributions to the research field of covert 
communications and data hiding. Little previous work has focused on the study of 
Digital Certificates as possible carriers for the transmission of secret data. Much of its 
importance lies in the fact that public-key certificates are considered the cornerstone 
of Public Key Infrastructures. The implementation and deployment of these 
infrastructures has been plagued by obstacles, which include the complexity of the 
task, poor understanding of them and numerous interoperability issues. The fact that 
they can be used for the purposes discussed in this study provides another matter of 
concern for their adoption and viability. 
 
In order to understand the implications of this contribution, this work also provides a 
comprehensive, up to date overview of the current state of covert communications 
research, including many important techniques and methodologies, some of which 
will be the focus of discussions in the future. As the research community has directed 
extensive efforts on identifying covert channels, it is now looking to broaden and 
diversify the research.  In particular, many of the detection and prevention approaches 
summarized in this study are likely to be the central focus of research in the following 
years.  
 
It must also be said that the mechanism and methodologies proposed in this study are 
just a few in an incredibly large universe of possibilities. It can be safely asserted that 
the possibilities for establishing covert communications through network covert 
channels are almost endless. This is good reason to recommend that future research 
should direct its efforts in the development of generic detection and prevention 
mechanisms to counter the threat posed by these channels. 
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